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Abstract
We study the complexity of rationalizing network formation. In this problem we fix an underlying
model describing how selfish parties (the vertices) produce a graph by making individual decisions to
form or not form incident edges. The model is equipped with a notion of stability (or equilibrium), and
we observe a set of “snapshots” of graphs that are assumed to be stable. From this we would like to infer
some unobserved data about the system: edge prices, or how much each vertex values short paths to each
other vertex.
We study two rationalization problems arising from the network formation model of Jackson and
Wolinsky [JW96]. When the goal is to infer edge prices, we observe that the rationalization problem is
easy. The problem remains easy even when rationalizing prices do not exist and we instead wish to find
prices that maximize the stability of the system.
In contrast, when the edge prices are given and the goal is instead to infer valuations of each vertex
by each other vertex, we prove that the rationalization problem becomes NP-hard. Our proof exposes a
close connection between rationalization problems and the Inequality-SAT (I-SAT) problem.
Finally and most significantly, we prove that an approximation version of this NP-complete rational-
ization problem is NP-hard to approximate to within better than a 1/2 ratio. This shows that the trivial
algorithm of setting everyone’s valuations to infinity (which rationalizes all the edges present in the input
graphs) or to zero (which rationalizes all the non-edges present in the input graphs) is the best possible
assuming P 6= NP. To do this we prove a tight (1/2+δ)-approximation hardness for a variant of I-SAT in
which all coefficients are non-negative. This in turn follows from a tight hardness result for MAX-LINR+
(linear equations over the reals, with non-negative coefficients), which we prove by a (non-trivial) mod-
ification of the recent result of Guruswami and Raghavendra [GR07] which achieved tight hardness for
this problem without the non-negativity constraint.
Our technical contributions regarding the hardness of I-SAT and MAX-LINR+ may be of independent
interest, given the generality of these problems.
1 Introduction
In any market setting where different goods are available at different prices, consumers demonstrate a re-
vealed preference for a particular bundle by choosing to buy it. They do so in spite of the existence of other
bundles of goods that may be more affordable. Revealed preference theory in economics is a well-studied
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area [Sam48, Afr67, Die73, Var82] that uses these observed choices to infer preference profiles, and, more
subtly, to argue about the limitations of such inferences by identifying settings in which simple classes of
preference profiles (e.g. linear utility functions) can always rationalize data satisfying basic axioms — the
conclusion being that experiments of this sort cannot be expected to provide evidence that a more compli-
cated (e.g. non-linear) preference profile is actually in use.
From a computer science perspective, a natural question is: how hard is it, computationally, to infer
unobserved quantities (e.g. preferences profiles, utility functions, prices) that explain or rationalize the
observed market data? Such problems abound in systems where there is an underlying notion of stability or
equilibrium (and one assumes that the observed data represent stable instances).
In certain classical settings [Afr67], rationalization amounts to solving a linear program, and so it is im-
mediately seen to be easy. Other settings have a more combinatorial feel, such as rationalizing matchings,
which we studied in previous work [KU08]. In this problem the input is a collection of bipartite matchings,
each meant to represent the observed outcome of a two-sided market. We showed in [KU08] that determin-
ing the existence of preference orders under which the matchings are all stable matchings is NP-complete,
and NP-hard to approximate to within a constant factor.
In this work, we consider the rationalization problem for network formation games. We study two
variants of a prominent model due to Jackson and Wolinsky [JW96] that describes how selfish parties (the
vertices) produce a graph by making individual decisions to form or not form incident edges. The model
is equipped with a notion of stability (or equilibrium), and we observe a set of “snapshots” of graphs that
are assumed to be stable. From this we would like to infer some unobserved data about the system: in one
variant we are interested in edge prices; in the other, we are interested in how much each vertex values short
paths to each other vertex. Both variants resemble the settings in which the rationalization problem can be
solved using linear programming (in the sense that the equilibrium conditions can be expressed as linear
inequalities), and yet they have a combinatorial component because the participants’ total utility depends on
the length of various shortest paths in the network.
In this paper we show an interesting contrast: inferring “per-edge” quantities (i.e., prices) is easy, while
inferring “end-to-end” quantities (i.e., the value each vertex u assigns to having a short path to each other
vertex v) is hard. In the latter case we show a tight (1/2 + δ) inapproximability result (and this is our most
technically significant contribution). The 1/2 ratio implies that the trivial approximation algorithm that sets
everyone’s valuations to infinity (which rationalizes all the edges present in the input graphs) or to zero
(which rationalizes all the non-edges present in the input graphs) is the best possible assuming P 6= NP.
1.1 The network formation model and two rationalization problems
The network formation model we study is one proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky [JW96]. In this model,
there are n vertices, and each pair (u, v) (“potential edge”) has an associated price and a distance. A
network formation process produces a graph G, and given this outcome, the utility that accrues to each
vertex v depends on two additional features of the model: (1) a non-increasing function f from distances
to the non-negative reals (think of f(d) as representing the value of having a connection of length d), and
(2) “intrinsic values” of vertex u by v for each u 6= v. The utility realized by vertex v is then the aggregate
distance minus the price of the edges in v’s subset, where the aggregate distance is the sum over vertices u
of v’s intrinsic value of u times f applied to the shortest path length in G to each u.
The equilibrium concept here is not a Nash equilibrium1 , but rather a simpler notion of pairwise stability;
1This is because we only consider unilateral deviations of a player to an adjacent strategy – one in which a single edge has been
added or removed – instead of to any alternative strategy.
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the vertex strategies are stable if (1) for each edge (u, v) in G, both v’s and u’s marginal utility of forming
edge (u, v) is non-negative, and (2) for each non-edge (u, v) inG either u’s or v’s marginal utility of forming
edge (u, v) is non-positive.
We consider two rationalization problems arising under this model. In the first, which we call STABLE-
PRICES, we are trying to infer edge prices, and we assume the other data (distances, the function f , and the
pairwise “intrinsic values”) are fixed or given. Specifically, we are given a collection of distance-weighted
graphs G1, G2, . . . , Gm on the same underlying vertex set, that arise from equilibrium play. In addition, we
are given the function f (as a circuit computing it), and the pairwise intrinsic values (which are the same
across the different graphs). We do not observe the (potential) edge prices (which are the same across the
different graphs). We are interested in determining edge prices that rationalize G1, G2, . . . , Gm; i.e., for
which each Gi is stable, or “in equilibrium,” in the above sense.
In the second rationalization problem under consideration, which we call STABLE-VALUES, we are
trying to infer the pairwise “intrinsic values,” and we assume the other data (latencies, the function f , and
the edge prices) are given. Specifically, as above, we are given a collection of distance-weighted graphs
G1, G2, . . . , Gm on the same underlying vertex set, that arise from equilibrium play. In addition, we are
given the function f (as a circuit2), and the edge prices (which are the same across the different graphs);
we do not observe the pairwise “intrinsic values” (which are the same across the different graphs). We are
interested in determining pairwise intrinsic values that rationalize G1, G2, . . . , Gm; i.e., for which each Gi
is stable, or “in equilibrium”, in the above sense.
We also consider an optimization version of STABLE-VALUES. In it, we are seeking pairwise “intrinsic
values” that maximize the number of stable edges/non-edges across all m input graphs among active pairs.
We deem a pair (u, v) active unless (1) it is an edge in all of the input graphs, with price zero (which
means effectively that edge (u, v) is present and fixed no matter how the other quantities are varied) or (2)
it is a non-edge in all of the input graphs, with price infinity (which means effectively that edge (u, v) is
permanently absent regardless of the other relevant quantities). Non-active pairs are “part of the landscape”
and intuitively do not contribute to the stability of the system. After this consideration, our optimization
problem is to infer intrinsic values with the maximum explanatory power (and note that edges/non-edges are
counted separately for each graph in which they appear).
For concreteness, we briefly describe an example scenario in which this rationalization problem naturally
arises. Social networks are formed among groups of people who ascribe a certain value (“friendship”) to
one another but establish connections with only those that they perceive to be most intrinsically valuable to
them. If, for instance, everybody in the group was in close physical proximity to one another (they all went
to the same high school or college) then the price of connecting to any one person is insignificant compared
to the value derived in return, no matter how small that may be. This would result in a clique as a stable
network. However, once this group becomes geographically spread out, the network formed in equilibrium
can become sparser, such as a star network, where all connections are made to a single person since the
cost of building mutual connections outweighs the utility gained. This illustrates that (when holding the
intrinsic value people in such a group have for one another to be invariant) temporal and spatial dynamics
affect the manner of how social networks coalesce and stabilize. While prices and distances might be readily
observable, the intrinsic value each individual has for each other individual is generally private. The problem
STABLE-VALUES in this paper asks to infer these values given (say) a series of snapshots taken over time of
a single social network of individuals.
2This permits unnatural functions f , but note that all of our reductions produce instances with very simple piecewise linear and
non-increasing f that one can easily envision occurring in the real world.
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1.2 Rationalization problems and I-SAT
As mentioned above, we show that STABLE-PRICES is easy, while STABLE-VALUES is hard. Our hardness
result is based on a reduction from a variant of the Inequality Satisfiability problem (abbreviated as I-SAT)
introduced recently by Hochbaum and Moreno-Centeno [HMC08]. An instance of I-SAT is a conjunction of
inequality-clauses, where each inequality-clause is a disjunction of linear inequalities over n real variables
x1, x2, . . . , xn. The instance is a “yes” instance iff there exists an assignment of real values to the variables
simultaneously satisfying all of the inequality-clauses. Hochbaum and Moreno-Centeno showed by a simple
reduction from 3-SAT that this class of problems is NP-complete even in the case when each inequality-
clause is a disjunction of only two inequalities.
The variant of I-SAT that we need for our reduction satisfies two additional constraints: (1) all of the
coefficients are non-negative (and we are seeking a solution only in the non-negative reals), and (2) there is
a partition of the variables into two sets S, T such that every inequality-clause is either the disjunction of
two ≤ inequalities, one supported in S and one supported in T , or a conjunction of two ≥ inequalities, one
supported in S and one in T . We call this variant I-SAT∗ .
To achieve our main hardness results, we show that I-SAT∗ is NP-complete, and that the optimization
version (maximize the number of inequality-clauses simultaneously satisfied) is NP-hard to approximate to
within (1/2 + δ). Note that, just as it is trivial to achieve approximation ratio 1/2 in the rationalization
problem to which we reduce, it is trivial to achieve approximation ratio 1/2 here by either setting all vari-
ables to zero (satisfying all the inequality-clauses of the first type) or setting all variables sufficiently large
(satisfying all the inequality-clauses of the second type).
The ease of translating between these problems brings us to an important observation. Not only is I-SAT
useful as a starting point for reductions involving the hard rationalization problem in this paper, but we
contend it is the abstract computational problem that captures rationalization problems more generally. It
is common for the “stability conditions” arising in a rationalization problem to be expressible by a finite
Boolean formula whose inputs are inequalities in the (real) quantities being inferred. This is true, e.g., for
the bipartite matchings problem studied in [KU08] (the quantities being inferred are the values each left
node has for each right node, and the familiar stability condition for stable matchings is expressible as the
disjunction of two inequalities involving these quantities), for the rationalization problems studied here, and
those mentioned in the introduction. Even the positivity constraint we add arises naturally in many such
settings, as utilities, prices, etc. are often assumed to be non-negative.
Thus we expect that a more complete understanding of the approximability of I-SAT (which to our
knowledge has not been studied prior to this paper) can serve as a useful starting point for understanding the
approximability of rationalization problems more generally, and we view this as an important contribution
of this paper.
1.3 Hardness of approximating I-SAT∗ via MAX-LINR+
For the general I-SAT problem, there is an easy reduction from MAX-LINR (linear equations over the reals).
Namely, for each equation
∑
i aixi = b, we produce the pair of I-SAT clauses
∑
i aixi ≤ b and
∑
i aixi ≥ b.
MAX-LINR was (only recently) shown to have a PCP system with (1−ǫ) completeness and γ soundness
[GR07] (with ǫ, γ close to 0), which gives rise to (1/2+ δ)-inapproximability for the general I-SAT problem
via this reduction (although, the non-perfect completeness means this gap is between classes of unsatisfiable
instances, which is a minor drawback).
We need a similar hardness result for our variant, I-SAT∗, which crucially entails a positivity constraint.
In the [GR07] inapproximability result (and similar inapproximability results using the basic framework of
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Hastad [Ha˚s01]), the equations all have the form xi + xj − xk = 0 since they arise from linearity tests
performed by the verifier in the PCP system. Thus, they are not suitable for proving inapproximability for
I-SAT∗ . Simple transformations like translating the origin do not work, and the natural idea of introducing
new variables x′i and the constraints xi + x′i = 0 (and using x′i in place of −xi to remove the negative
coefficients) does not preserve the inapproximability.
It is also important to note that while Hastad’s inapproximability results for MAX-LINFp can be eas-
ily transformed into similar inapproximability results for MAX-LINZ, this transformation introduces large
coefficients (of magnitude p), which prohibit the clever trick in [GR07] that is used to argue that the inap-
proximability carries over to the reals.
So our hands are somewhat tied: to obtain the (1/2 + δ) inapproximability for I-SAT∗ , we really need
an exact analog of [GR07], but one that produces equations with positive coefficients. In Section 5, we
give such a result for MAX-LINR+ , showing that it is NP-hard to distinguish between an instance with a
(1 − ǫ) fraction satisfiable assignment and one with at most δ fraction satisfiable, and in turn a (1/2 + δ)
inapproximability result for I-SAT∗ . Doing so requires more than a superficial modification of the proof in
[GR07]. In stating our results, we abstract properties of the distribution used for the verifier’s queries that
are sufficient for the general proof strategy of [GR07] to work, and then utilize a different distribution (and
some minor changes in the Fourier analysis) to eventually produce equations with all coefficients +1. This
result is our most significant technical contribution.
1.4 Related work
Rationalizability has been well-studied under the domain of revealed preference theory and social choice
theory by economists [Sam48, Var82, Spr00, FST04, BV06, Var06, Ech08]. Traditionally, the questions
have been connected with characterizing the implications of various solution concepts to games and market
settings, and whether these implications can be tested based on data obtained from consumer choices.
In connection with studying network formation games, while the question of understanding the prop-
erties and limitations of equilibria is not new [JW96, DM97, JW01, DJ03, FLM+03], to the best of our
knowledge there is no previous work done with respect to either the rationalizability question for these
games in general, or the Jackson-Wolinsky model of network formation in particular.
1.5 Outline
In Section 3 we formally define STABLE-PRICES, and observe that it is easy (and even the optimization
variant is easy to solve exactly). In Section 4 we define STABLE-VALUES and give a reduction from I-SAT∗ to
it. We then show that I-SAT∗ is NP-complete (this is not subsumed by our eventual inapproximability result,
since this reduction has perfect completeness). In Section 5 we state an approximation preserving reduction
from MAX-LINR+ to I-SAT∗, and we then describe the PCP system (based on a non-trivial modification
of [GR07]) that implies ǫ inapproximability for it. This yields the tight (1/2 + δ) inapproximability for
STABLE-VALUES.
2 Jackson-Wolinsky model for network formation games
We describe formally the seminal model for stability of network formation games as formulated by Jackson
and Wolinsky [JW96]. The model comprises:
• n agents V
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• pairwise distance function d : V × V → R+
• pairwise intrinsic value function w : V × V → R+
• a function f : R+ → R that defines the contribution of a path of length d
• price profile c : V × V → R+
For a graph G and any two i, j ∈ V , we define dG(i, j) to be the distance of the shortest path P (i, j) from
i to j given by
∑
(u,v)∈P (i,j) d(u, v). Let Γ(v) be the set of neighbors of v. The utility agent i derives in
graph G, denoted ui(G), is given by:
ui(G) =
∑
j∈V
f(dG(i, j))w(i, j) −
∑
k∈Γ(i)
c(i, k)
Definition 2.1. A graph G = (V,E) is said to be pairwise stable with respect to d,w, f, c if:
1. for all i, j ∈ V such that (i, j) ∈ G,
ui(G) ≥ ui(G− (i, j)) and uj(G) ≥ uj(G− (i, j))
2. for all i, j ∈ V such that (i, j) /∈ G,
ui(G) ≥ ui(G+ (i, j)) or uj(G) ≥ uj(G+ (i, j))
In this definition both endpoints must prefer that an edge in G exists (or at least be indifferent to its
existence) for the edge to be stable; correspondingly a non-edge in G is stable if even one endpoint prefers
that is not be present (or at least is indifferent to its presence).
3 Finding stable prices when intrinsic values are known
In the first rationalization problem that we will call STABLE-PRICES, we consider a scenario where the
intrinsic values are known but the edge-prices are not. We are given a collection of undirected graphs
G1, . . . , Gm all of which are formed over a common set of vertices V . In addition, we are given the pairwise
distance functions for each Gi, di : V × V → R+. The rationalizability question entails inferring the prices
that players in each of the graphs would have to pay given that the graphs are in pairwise equilibrium.
In the above problem (and in the subsequent version, STABLE-VALUES) we assume that f is given to us
in the form of a circuit that takes as input numbers represented with some number of bits of precision that
is polynomial in the size of the rest of the input. This precision is sufficient to exactly express the shortest
path distance to which f is applied.
Theorem 3.1. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for STABLE-PRICES.
Proof. The algorithm is based on the simple intuition that for an edge to exist between two vertices v,w it
must be the case that the marginal utility that v derives by building that edge must be at least 0 and the same
for u, while for a non-edge (v,w), either v or w must have a marginal utility at most 0. These marginal
utilities are easy to compute, and they yield a system of linear inequalities exactly describing stable edge
prices. For details, please refer to a full version of this paper.
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Problem 1. STABLE-PRICES
Given: Collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm over common set
of vertices V
Pairwise distance functions di : V × V → R+ for
i = 1, . . . ,m
Intrinsic value function w : V × V → R+
Path distance contribution function f : R+ → R,
where f is non-increasing.
Find: Price profile c that rationalizes G1, . . . , Gm, i.e. for
which Gi is stable w.r.t. di, w, f, c for all i, if it exists.
We think of a price profile c as rationalizing (u, v) inGi if the conditions in Definition 2.1 hold for (u, v).
An optimization version of the STABLE-PRICES problem is, given a collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm, to find
a price profile that rationalizes the maximum number of “(u, v) in Gi” pairs. It is easy to see that the same
algorithm described above will also work to find a price profile that would solve the optimization problem
for STABLE-PRICES exactly.
Corollary 3.2. Given an instance of STABLE-PRICES there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to construct
a price profile c that rationalizes the maximum number of “(u, v) in Gi” pairs.
4 Finding stable intrinsic values when prices are known
In the problem of STABLE-VALUES, we consider the scenario where the edge-prices are known but the
intrinsic values function w is unknown. We define STABLE-VALUES below and show that STABLE-VALUES
is NP-hard by a reduction from a special variant of I-SAT (defined below).
Problem 2. STABLE-VALUES
Given: Collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm over common set of
vertices V
Pairwise distance functions di : V × V → R+ for
i = 1, . . . ,m
Path distance contribution function f : R+ → R where
f is non-increasing
Price profile c : V × V → R+
Find: Intrinsic values function w : V × V → R+ that
rationalizes G1, . . . , Gm, i.e. for which Gi
is pairwise stable w.r.t. di, w, f, c for all i, if it exists.
Theorem 4.1. I-SAT∗ is NP-complete.
Proof. We give a reduction from 3-SAT. Consider an instance of 3-SAT given by n variables x1, . . . , xn and
m clauses C1, . . . , Cm. For each variable xi our instance of I-SAT∗ has two variables zti , z
f
i and for each
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Problem 3. I-SAT∗
Given: n variables x1, . . . , xn, and a partition S ∪ T of [n].
m clauses that are either of type 1:(∑
i∈S aixi ≤ 1
)
OR
(∑
j∈T cjxj ≤ 1
)
or of type 2:(∑
i∈S aixi ≥ 1
)
AND
(∑
j∈T cjxj ≥ 1
)
,
where all ai, cj ≥ 0.
Find: An assignment for x1, . . . , xn ∈ R+ satisfying all m
clauses, if it exists.
clause Cj , we have three auxiliary variables aj , bj , cj . In total, we will have 2n + 3m unknowns in our
I-SAT∗ instance and we partition this into S = {zti , z
f
i |i = 1, . . . , n} and T = {aj , bj , cj |j = 1, . . . ,m}.
For each clause Cj , we produce three I-SAT∗ clauses of type 1 and one of type 2. Suppose Cj =
(xp + x¯q + xr) by way of example. Our reduction produces the type 2 clause:(
zti
3
+
zfi
3
≥ 1
)
AND
(
aj
4
+
bj
4
+
cj
4
≥ 1
)
(1)
and the following three type 1 clauses (
ztp ≤ 1
)
OR (aj ≤ 1)
(zfq ≤ 1) OR (bj ≤ 1)(
ztr ≤ 1
)
OR (cj ≤ 1)
Suppose that there exists a satisfiable assignment for the 3-SAT instance. Then, for each xi that is true in this
assignment we let zti = 1, z
f
i = 2 and for each xi that is false, we let zti = 2, z
f
i = 1. For each clause Cj , set
one of the aj , bj , cj variables to 2 that corresponds to a true literal, and the others to 1. These assignments
satisfy all four I-SAT∗ clauses corresponding to clause Cj .
In the other direction, we claim that setting xi to be true for exactly those i such that zti ≤ 1 is a
satisfying assignment. For each clause Cj , it cannot be the case that aj , bj, cj are all ≤ 1, as this would
violate the associated type 2 I-SAT∗ clause. Thus at least one of the variable appearing positively in Cj must
have zti ≤ 1 or one of the variables appearing negatively must have z
f
i ≤ 1. Moreover, the type 2 I-SAT∗
clause ensures that it can’t be the case that zti and z
f
i are both ≤ 1, so as claimed, the derived assignment is
consistent, and it is a satisfying assignment since it makes at least one literal in each clause true.
The following reduction is actually approximation preserving, a fact that we will use in Section 5.
Theorem 4.2. STABLE-VALUES is NP-complete.
Proof. Our proof is by reduction from I-SAT∗.
Suppose we are given an instance of I-SAT∗ with m clauses C1, . . . , Cm over n unknowns x1, . . . , xn
where each clause Ci is of type 1:(∑
i∈S
aixi ≤ 1
)
OR
∑
j∈T
cjxj ≤ 1

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or of type 2 (∑
i∈S
aixi ≥ 1
)
AND
∑
j∈T
cjxj ≥ 1

and all ai, cj ≥ 0 and S ∪ T is a partition of [n]. Fix L to be the least integer that is greater than all of the
ai, cj coefficients appearing in these clauses. Our reduction produces m edge-weighted graphs G1, . . . , Gm
on (n+ 3) vertices labeled v1, . . . , vn, u, s, t as follows.
For each clause C (of either type), we construct a base graph G. For each i ∈ S, G contains edge (s, vi)
with weight d(s, vi) = L + ai and edge (t, vi) with weight d(t, vi) = L. Similarly for each j ∈ T , G
contains edge (s, vj) with weight d(s, vj) = L, and edge (t, vj) with weight d(t, vj) = L + cj . We also
include edges (s, u), (u, t) with weights d(s, u) = d(t, u) = L/2.
If C is of type 1, the base graph is the graph associated with C; refer to Figure 1. If C is of type 2, we
add the edge (s, t) with weight d(s, t) = 0 to the base graph; refer to Figure 2.
We set the cost of an edge from s to t to be c(s, t) = 1. Note that with the exception of the edge (s, t),
all of our graphs contain exactly the same set of edges. For any pair of vertices (p, q) other than (s, t), we
set c(p, q) = 0 if (p, q) is an edge and c(p, q) =∞ if (p, q) is a non-edge.
Finally, we define the piecewise-linear function f as follows:
f(x) =
{
−L 0 ≤ x ≤ L
−x x > L
b
b
b
b
b
vj vi
s t
u
L L
T S
L/
2 L/2
L
+
a
i
L
+
c j
Figure 1: G from clause of type 1, with edge weights
This completes the description of the reduction. We now show that the stability conditions for each
graph are exactly the conjunction or disjunction of linear inequalities of the associated I-SAT∗ clause.
Fix a graph G associated with I-SAT∗ clause C . We first note that all stability conditions not involving
edge (s, t) are trivially satisfied. This is because for any other pair (p, q), the cost is 0 if (p, q) is an edge
in G (so both p and q are indifferent to keeping it, which makes it stable), and the cost is ∞ if (p, q) is a
non-edge in G (so neither p nor q benefit from adding it, making it stable).
Now we focus on the stability conditions for (s, t), which are
us(G+ (s, t)) ≤ us(G) OR ut(G+ (s, t)) ≤ ut(G)
if (s, t) is a non-edge in G and
us(G− (s, t)) ≥ us(G) AND ut(G− (s, t)) ≥ ut(G)
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bb
b
b
b
vj vi
s t
u
0
L L
T S
L/
2 L/2
L
+
a
i
L
+
c j
Figure 2: G from clause of type 2, with edge weights
if (s, t) is an edge in G. The following notation will be helpful. For a graph G, edge e and pair of vertices
u, v, we define
∆f+e(u, v) = f(dG+e(u, v)) − f(dG(u, v))
which can be thought of as the “value added” (for vertices u and v) by adding edge e to the graph G.
Similarly we define
∆f−e(u, v) = f(dG(u, v)) − f(dG−e(u, v))
which can be thought of as the “value added” (for vertices u and v) by deleting edge e from the graph G.
After expanding and rearranging terms, the pairwise stability conditions for (s, t) then become:∑
v∆f+(s,t)(s, v) · w(s, v) ≤ c(s, t)
OR∑
v∆f+(s,t)(t, v) · w(t, v) ≤ c(s, t)
if (s, t) is a non-edge in G and ∑
v∆f−(s,t)(s, v) · w(s, v) ≥ c(s, t)
AND∑
v∆f−(s,t)(t, v) · w(t, v) ≥ c(s, t)
if (s, t) is an edge in G.
Table 1: Shortest path distance for G constructed from a type 1 clause
(p, q) dG(p, q) dG+(s,t)(p, q) ∆f+(s,t)(p, q)
(s, vi) i ∈ S L+ ai L ai
(t, vi) i ∈ S L L 0
(s, vj) j ∈ T L L 0
(t, vj) j ∈ T L+ cj L cj
(s, t) L 0 0
(s, u), (t, u) L/2 L/2 0
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Table 2: Shortest path distance for G constructed from a type 2 clause
(p, q) dG−(s,t)(p, q) dG(p, q) ∆f−(s,t)(p, q)
(s, vi) i ∈ S L+ ai L ai
(t, vi) i ∈ S L L 0
(s, vj) j ∈ T L L 0
(t, vj) j ∈ T L+ cj L cj
(s, t) L 0 0
(s, u), (t, u) L/2 L/2 0
If (s, t) is a non-edge in G (so G was constructed from a type 1 clause C), then Table 1 calculates the
coefficients of w(s, ·), and w(t, ·) in the above inequalities; if (s, t) is an edge in G (so G was constructed
from a type 2 clause C) then Table 2 calculates the coefficients. Plugging these in, and using the fact that
c(s, t) = 1, we get exactly ∑
i∈S ai · w(s, vi) ≤ 1
OR∑
j∈T ci · w(t, vj) ≤ 1
in the case that G was constructed from type 1 clause Ci, and∑
i∈S ai · w(s, vi) ≥ 1
AND∑
j∈T ci · w(t, vj) ≥ 1
in the case that G was constructed from type 2 clause Ci.
Thus in both cases the stability conditions arising in graph G constructed from I-SAT∗ clause C are
exactly the constraints given by the clause, with the intrinsic values w(s, vi) playing the role of the variables
xi for i ∈ S, and the intrinsic values w(s, vj) playing the role of the variables xj for j ∈ T .
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
We now get to the meat of the paper, where we give a tight inapproximability result for an optimization
version of STABLE-VALUES.
5 A tight inapproximability result for STABLE-VALUES
Before defining the optimization version of STABLE-VALUES, we need to define the notion of active pairs:
Definition 5.1. Given an instance of STABLE-VALUES containing a collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm all
over a set of vertices V and a price profile c : V × V → R+, a pair (u, v) ∈ V × V is said to be an active
pair if it is not the case that i) (u, v) ∈ Gi for all i AND c(u, v) = 0, or ii) (u, v) /∈ Gi for any i AND
c(u, v) =∞.
As explained in the introduction, a pair (u, v) that is not an active pair effectively “comes for free” since
regardless of what the intrinsic values for u, v are, the pairwise stability conditions are trivially satisfied
because c(u, v) = 0 if (u, v) ∈ Gi for all i and c(u, v) =∞ if (u, v) /∈ Gi for any i.
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As before, we think of an intrinsic values function w as rationalizing an active pair (u, v) in Gi if the
stability conditions in Definition 2.1 hold for (u, v). Then, the MAX-STABLE-VALUES problem is to seek
intrinsic values that rationalize the maximum number of active pairs (u, v), counted separately for each Gi.
We observed in the introduction that there is a trivial 1/2-factor approximation algorithm. More precisely,
for each non-edge, either adding it does not change the aggregate distance contributions for either of its
endpoints (in which case it is stable regardless of the intrinsic valuations), or else it is rationalized when the
intrinsic valuations are all set to 0; similarly for each edge, either removing it does not change the aggregate
distance contributions for its endpoints (in which case it is stable iff its cost is 0, regardless of the intrinsic
valuations), or else it is rationalized when the intrinsic valuations are all set to ∞. Thus one of the two
extremes (setting all intrinsic valuations to 0, or all intrinsic valuations to ∞) rationalizes at least 1/2 of the
“(u, v) in Gi” pairs that are rationalized by an optimum solution. We prove in this section that this 1/2
factor is tight assuming P 6= NP .
To our end of showing a hardness result for MAX-STABLE-VALUES we show an inapproximability result
for MAX-LINZ+ , which is the main technical contribution of this paper. Although MAX-STABLE-VALUES is
actually defined over the reals and would admittedly require us to show a hardness result for MAX-LINR+ ,
we are able to employ a clever trick shown in [GR07] that makes it sufficient for us to work with MAX-LINZ+
and then carry the result over to the reals as long as we can ensure that the co-efficients in the MAX-LINZ+
instance we obtain are bounded and the equations have sparse support.
Problem 4. MAX-LINZ+
Given: n variables x1, . . . , xn
m equations, each of which is of the type∑
i aixi = b
where ai, b ∈ Z+ for all i = 1, . . . , n
Find: An assignment for x1, . . . , xn ∈ Z+ that satisfies the
maximum number of equations.
Theorem 5.2. Given an instance of MAX-LINZ+ , for all positive constants ǫ, δ it is NP-hard to distinguish
between the following two cases:
• There exists a solution satisfying at least a (1− ǫ) fraction of the linear equations in the instance.
• Every solution satisfies at most a δ fraction of the linear equations.
The above promise problem will be referred to as MAX-LINZ+(1− ǫ, δ). Our proof follows the outline
of the proof for Theorem 3.4 in [GR07]. In the remainder of this section, we go through the proof of
Theorem 5.2, pointing out the crucial points where our proof needs to differ from [GR07]. We first define
the LABEL-COVER problem below.
Definition 5.3. An instance of the LABEL-COVER(c, s) problem comprises a bipartite graphH = (A,B, E),
a set of labels Σ and a set of projection mappings πe : Σ → Σ for each edge e ∈ E . An assignment
A : (A ∪ B) → Σ is a mapping from the set of vertices onto the set of labels and is legal for an edge
e = (u, v) if πe(A(u)) = A(v). We wish to ascertain for this instance of the problem if
• there exists an assignment A that is legal for at least a c fraction of edges, or
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• every assignment is legal for at most an s fraction of the edges.
The following theorem gives a hardness of approximation result for LABEL-COVER and is due to
[ALM+98] based on a result of Raz’s. [Raz98]
Theorem 5.4. ([ALM+98, Raz98]) There exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large constant-
sized alphabets Σ, it is NP-hard to distinguish between an instance of LABEL-COVER that has an assign-
ment legal for all edges and one for which every assignment is legal for at most 1/|Σ|γ fraction of edges.
As we noted in Section 1.3, there doesn’t seem to be an easy reduction from MAX-LINZ (shown to be
hard to approximate in [GR07]) or from MAX-LINFp (shown to be hard to approximate in [Ha˚s01]). Both
those results are obtained by reductions from LABEL-COVER and involve constructing equations of the
form x + y − z = c. Most of our effort in our proof is spent on giving an alternative reduction that gives
rise to equations with coefficients in Z+. Specifically, our proof abstracts properties of the verifier query
distribution that are sufficient for main steps of the [GR07] proof. We then specify a different distribution
than the one in [GR07] that satisfies these properties, as well as an additional symmetry property that is key
to our final PCP system for MAX-LINZ+ .
5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.2
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5.2. Consider an instance of the LABEL-COVER(1, δ)
problem comprising the bipartite graph G(U, V,E) over n vertices and m edges, a set of labels Σ =
{1, . . . , h} and constraint relations πe : Σ→ Σ.
In our PCP system, the proof comprises the labels for all vertices encoded using the Long Code we
define below.
Definition 5.5. [GR07] For a label r ∈ [h], the codeword C(r) is an evaluation of the projection function
fr : Z
h
+ → Z+ given by fr((z1, . . . , zh)) = zr over Zh+. In other words, C(r)[x] = xr.
In other words, the proof is given to the verifier as a sequence (C(A(v1)), . . . , C(A(vn))) where A is
the purported legal assignment. The verifier makes queries to the proof at three locations. These locations
are chosen based on probability distributions P1, P2, and Q over Zh+. In the end, as in [GR07], we will
discretize and truncate these distributions so that the verifier uses O(log n) randomness, so even though the
proof is formally of infinite length, the verifier only ever sees a (fixed) polynomially large fragment.
Our proof will use the following properties of probability distributions over Zh+:
Definition 5.6. P is said to be (M, δ)-heavy if∑
x∈[M ]h
P (x) ≥ (1− δ).
Definition 5.7. P is said to be (δ, L)-decay-resilient if for all x ∈ [L]h and any y ∈ Zh+
P (y + x)
P (y)
≥ δ.
Definition 5.7 encapsulates and highlights a crucial property used in a technical step in the soundness
analysis. We are now ready to define P1, P2, which have the following form (they are parameterized by
p, c1, c2,Γ1,Γ2):
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Definition 5.8. For j = 1, 2 we define the functions Pj over Zh+ to be
Pj((x1, . . . , xh)) = Γj
h∏
i=1
e−cj |xi−
(p−1)
2
|. (2)
where Γj = (1− e−cj)h ; j = 1, 2 are some constants.
The following proposition describes exactly how we must choose M, t, p, cj :
Proposition 5.9. There exist positive integers M = M(h, δ), t = t(h, δ), a prime p = Ω(M), and positive
reals c1, c2,Γ1,Γ2 for which P1 and P2 with these parameter settings are probability distributions, both
(M, δ)-heavy, and P2 is (1/4,M + t)-decay-resilient.
Proof. We first prove that P1 and P2 as defined above in Definition 5.8 are probability distributions. This is
easy to see since for any choice of c1, c2, we can appropriately choose normalization constants Γ1,Γ2 so as
to ensure that P1, P2 are probability distributions. Next, we show that P1, P2 are (M, δ)-heavy. Note first
that for any (x1, . . . , xh) ∈ Zh+ − [M ]h, there exists some r such that xr > M . Therefore:∑
(x1,...,xh)∈Z
h
+−[M ]
h
Pj((x1, . . . , xh)) =
∑
(x1,...,xh)∈Z
h
+−[M ]
h
Γje
−c
∑h
i=1 |xi−
p−1
2
|
≤
h∑
r=1
∑
(x1,...,xh):xr>M
Γje
−cj
∑h
i=1 |xi−
p−1
2
|
≤ h(1 − e−cj)he−cj(M−
p−1
2 )
The right-hand side is less than δ for
M −
p− 1
2
≥
1
cj
· ln
[
h(1− e−cj )h
δ
]
To show that P2 is (1/4,M + t)-decay-resilient, we invoke Lemma 6.5 from [GR07], which we restate
using our terminology below:
Lemma 5.10. (Lemma 6.5, [GR07]) For all N > 0, and c2 < ln 4hN , the following is true for any x ∈
[N ]h, y ∈ Zh+:
P2(y + x)
P2(x)
≥ 1/4.
We compile all the constraints on our ability to choose M, cj , t, p:
M −
p− 1
2
≥
1
cj
· ln
[
h(1 − e−cj)h
δ
]
(3)
c2 ≤
ln 4
h(M + t)
(4)
First, we set t to be the least integer greater than h2/δ. Next, we proceed to set c1, c2. Our choice of c1 is
determined directly from [GR07] (pg 6), in order to ensure that the key lemma we use from their result in
the soundness analysis (Lemma 5.15) goes through, and is given by:
c1 = min
{
1
h
ln
(
1 + 4δ2
)
, ln
(
1 + 4
(
δ
4
)5
·
δ
2h
)}
.
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We set c2, based on (3) and (4), to be:
c2 = ln
[
1
1− (δ21/h/h)1/h
]
,
Choosing M to be the smallest integer greater than 5
(
h
δ
) h
ln(1+4δ2) , and p to be p = ⌈3M/2⌉, we will satisfy
all the required properties of P1, P2.
From now on we will fix M,p and the parameters defining probability distributions P1, P2 as in the
above proposition. We let µ be a random variable over Zh+ generated by picking each coordinate to be 0
with probability (1− ǫ) and an integer chosen randomly from [t] with probability ǫ. We denote Q to be the
probability distribution with which µ is chosen.
Now we can describe the verifier test. Let X1,X2 be random variables over Zh distributed according to
P1, P2, respectively. We use x◦πe to denote the permutation of πe applied to the co-ordinates of x ∈ Zh. In
other words (x ◦ πe)i = xpie(i). Using this notation, define random variable X3 = p− (X1 ◦ πe +X2 + µ),
where p denotes (p, p, . . . , p). The equation that the verifier checks is:
C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[X3] = p. (5)
Lemma 5.11. The PCP system for MAX-LINZ+ described above has (1− ǫ) completeness.
Proof. Suppose A is indeed a legal assignment for all edges e ∈ E(G). This means that for any edge
e = (u, v), πe(A(v)) = A(u). Therefore, C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[X3]
= X1A(u) +X2A(v) + pA(v) − (X1 ◦ πe +X2 + µ)A(v)
= X1A(u) +X2A(v) + p−X1pie(A(v)) −X2A(v) − µA(v)
= p− µA(v)
Recalling how we picked µ, we know that µA(v) is 0 with probability exactly (1 − ǫ) and hence, (5) is
satisfied with probability (1− ǫ).
Lemma 5.12. The PCP system for MAX-LINZ+ described above has 19δ soundness error.
Proof. To argue for soundness, suppose A is an assignment that causes the verifier to accept with probability
at least δ′ = 19δ. This means that over all e = (u, v) chosen uniformly at random from E(G), and x1,x2, µ
chosen according to their respective probability distributions P1, P2, Q from Zh+:
Pr
e,X1,X2,µ
[C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[p − (X1 ◦ πe +X2 + µ)] = p] ≥ 19δ
The following fact is handy:
Fact 5.13. Let P be a (1/4, (M + t))-decay-resilient probability distribution over Zh+. Then, for any
y ∈ [M + t]h and all x ∈ Zh+:
P (x) ≤ 2
√
P (x+ y) · P (x)
Proof. Since P is (1/4, (M + t))-decay-resilient it satisfies the following inequality:
P (x) ≤ 4P (x+ y)
≤ 2
√
P (x+ y) · P (x)
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The following lemma is based on the first step of the proof technique used in [GR07] applied to our
setting:
Lemma 5.14. Let P1, P2 be probability distributions over Zh+ and Q be a probability distribution over [t]h
such that P1, P2, Q satisfy the following properties:
1. P1, P2, Q are (p/3, δ)-heavy.
2. P2 is (1/4,M + t)-decay-resilient.
3. P2 is symmetric around (p/2, . . . , p/2), i.e. P2(x) = P2(p− x)
Suppose that X1,X2, µ are chosen respectively from distributions P1, P2, Q and e = (u, v) is chosen uni-
formly at random. Denote X3 to be X3 = p− (X1 ◦ πe +X2 + µ). Then, if:
Pr
e,X1,X2,µ
[C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[X3] = p] ≥ 23δ,
letting Υ(u,v)p (X1,X2, µ) be the indicator variable for the event
C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[p − (X1 ◦ πe +X2 + µ)] = 0 mod p
the following must hold:
E(u,v)
 ∑
x1,x2,x3∈[p/3]h
P1(x1)
√
P2 (x2) · P2(x3)Q(µ)Υ
(u,v)
p (x1, x2, µ)
 ≥ 8δ
Proof. Note first that since P1 is (p/3, δ)-heavy, and p/3 < M , it is also (M, δ)-heavy. Furthermore, since
µ is by default chosen from [t]h, with probability at most δ our choice of X1 will lie outside [M ]h and so:
Pr
e,X1,X2,µ
[
C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[X3 ] = p|X1 ∈ [M ]
h
]
≥ 22δ
Denoting Υe(x1, x2, µ) to be the indicator variable for the event:
C(A(u))[x1] + C(A(v))[x2] + C(A(v))[p − (x1 ◦ πe + x2 + µ)] = p
we can rewrite the left-hand side above in terms of an expectation over all edges e(u, v):
Ee
 ∑
x1∈[M ]h,x2∈Zh+,µ∈[t]
h
P1(x1)P2(x2)Q(µ)Υ
(u,v)(x1, x2, µ)
 ≥ 22δ (6)
Combining (6) with Property 2 and Fact 5.13, we get:
Ee
 ∑
x1∈[M ]h,x2∈Zh+,µ∈[t]
h
P1(x1)
√
P2 (x2) · P2(x2 + x1 ◦ πe + µ)Q(µ)Υ
(u,v)(x1, x2, µ)
 ≥ 11δ
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Since P2 is symmetric around (p/2, . . . , p/2), P2(x2+x1 ◦π+µ) = P2(p− (x2+x1 ◦π+µ)) and hence
the above inequality becomes:
Ee
 ∑
x1∈[M ]h,x2∈Zh+,µ∈[t]
h
P1(x1)
√
P2 (x2) · P2(p− (x1 ◦ πe + x2 + µ))Q(µ)Υ
(u,v)(x1, x2, µ)
 ≥ 11δ
Observing that Υ(u,v)p (x1, x2, µ) ≥ Υ(u,v)(x1, x2, µ) and denoting x3 = p− (x1 ◦ πe + x2 + µ), we have:
Ee
 ∑
x1∈[M ]h,x2∈Zh+,µ∈[t]
h
P1(x1)
√
P2 (x2) · P2(x3)Q(µ)Υ
(u,v)
p (x1, x2, µ)
 ≥ 11δ
Since P1, P2, Q are (p/3, δ)-heavy:
E(u,v)
 ∑
x1,x2,µ∈[p/3]h
P1(x1)
√
P2 (x2) · P2(x3)Q(µ)Υ
(u,v)
p (x1, x2, µ)
 ≥ 8δ (7)
Note that the function Υ(u,v)p : [p]3h → {0, 1} is given by
Υ(u,v)p (x1, x2, µ) =
{
1 C(A(u))[x1] + C(A(v))[x2] + C(A(v))[x3] = 0 mod p,
0 otherwise.
Υ
(u,v)
p can equivalently be written as below:
Υ(u,v)p (x1, x2, µ) =
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
e
2piik
p
(C(A(u))[x1]+C(A(v))[x2]+C(A(v))[x3])
Substituting this in (7), the left-hand side becomes:
E(u,v)
1
p
∑
x1,x2,µ∈[
p
3
]h
P1(x1)
√
P2 (x2) · P2(x3)Q(µ)
(
p−1∑
k=0
e
2piik
p
(C(A(u))[x1]+C(A(v))[x2]+C(A(v))[x3])
)
We further simplify the term within the expectation:
1
p
∑
x1,x2,µ∈[
p
3
]h
P1(x1)
√
P2 (x2) · P2(x3)Q(µ)
(
p−1∑
k=0
e
2piik
p
(C(A(u))[x1]+C(A(v))[x2]+C(A(v))[x3])
)
=
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
x1,x2,µ∈[
p
3
]h
Q(µ)
(
P1(x1)e
2piik
p
C(A(u))[x1]
)(√
P2 (x2)e
2piik
p
C(A(v))[x2]
)(√
P2(x3)e
2piik
p
C(A(v))[x3 ]
)
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Setting Uu(x) = P1(x)e
2piik
p
C(A(u))[x]
and Vv(x) =
√
P2(x)e
2piik
p
C(A(v))[x]
, (7) now simplifies to:
E(u,v)
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
x1,x2,µ∈[
p
3
]h
Q(µ)Uu(x1)Vv(x2)Vv(x3)
 ≥ 8δ (8)
This is where our proof technique has a crucial point of departure from that used in [GR07]. Since our test
has only positive co-efficients, we do not have the luxury to make the substitution√
P2(x)e
− 2piik
p
C(A(v))[x] = Vv(x)
that is made in [GR07] which simplifies their analysis.
Consider the Fourier expansion for Uu described below:
Uu(x) =
∑
w∈[p]h
Ûu(w)e
2pii
p
〈w,x〉
where
Ûu(w) =
1
ph
∑
x∈[p]h
Uu(x)e
− 2pii
p
〈w,x〉
We substitute this and a similar Fourier expansion for Vv back in (8):
E(u,v)
[
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
x1,x2,µ
Q(µ)
∑
w1
Ûu(w1)e
2pii
p
〈w1,x1〉
∑
w2
V̂v(w2)e
2pii
p
〈w2,x2〉
∑
w3
V̂v(w3)e
2pii
p
〈w3,x3〉
]
≥ 8δ
Substituting x3 = (p− (x1 ◦ πe + x2 + µ)) the left-hand side becomes:
E(u,v)
[
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
x1,x2,µ
Q(µ)
∑
w1
Ûu(w1)e
2pii
p
〈w1,x1〉
∑
w2
V̂v(w2)e
2pii
p
〈w2,x2〉
∑
w3
V̂v(w3)e
2pii
p
〈w3,(p−(x1◦pie+x2+µ))〉
]
= E(u,v)
[
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
x1,x2,µ
Q(µ)
∑
w1
Ûu(w1)e
2pii
p
〈w1,x1〉
∑
w2
V̂v(w2)e
2pii
p
〈w2,x2〉
∑
w3
V̂v(w3)e
− 2pii
p
〈w3,(x1◦pie+x2+µ)〉
]
= E(u,v)
[
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
w1,w2,w3
Ûu(w1)V̂v(w2)V̂v(w3)
∑
x1
e
2pii
p
〈(w1−w3◦pi
−1
e ),x1〉
∑
x2
e
2pii
p
〈(w2−w3),x2〉
∑
µ
Q(µ)e−
2pii
p
〈w3,µ〉
]
where w3 ◦π−1e denotes the vector obtained by setting (w3 ◦π−1e )i =
∑
j∈pi−1e (i)
w3j for i = 1, . . . , h. Note
that for w1 6= w3 ◦π−1e ,
∑
x1
e
2pii
p
〈(w1−w3◦pi
−1
e ),x1〉 = 0 and similarly, for w2 6= w3,
∑
x2
e
2pii
p
〈(w2−w3),x2〉 =
0. Setting w = w3, the overall inequality simplifies to:
E(u,v)
[
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
w
(
phÛu(w ◦ π
−1
e )
)(
phV̂v(w)
2
)∑
µ
Q(µ)e−
2pii
p
〈w,µ〉
]
≥ 8δ (9)
Also, note that |V̂v(w)2| =
√(
V̂v(w)2 · V̂v(w)2
)
=
√(
V̂v(w) · V̂v(w)
)2
= |V̂v(w)|
2 using the simple
identity that z2 · z2 = (z · z)2 for any complex number z.
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Substituting back in (9), we obtain:
E(u,v)
[
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
∑
ω
(
phÛu(w ◦ π
−1
e )
)(
|phV̂v(w)|
2
)(∑
µ
Q(µ)e
− 2pii
p
〈w,µ〉
)]
≥ 8δ (10)
We are now ready to use the following lemma, again from [GR07] concerning probability distributions
P1, P2, Q and some assignment A of labels to vertices in G satisfying (10).
Lemma 5.15. ([GR07]) Let P1, P2, Q : Zh+ → [0, 1] be probability distributions and A : V (G) → [h] some
assignment of labels to vertices in G satisfying (10). Then, there exists a constant C such that
Pr
(u,v)
[A is legal for (u, v)] ≥ δ4/96C2
By choosing our original instance of LABEL-COVER(1, δ) to be such that h is large enough, we can
ensure that δ4/96C2 ≥ 1/hγ . This gives us a soundness of 19δ as required.
5.2 Tying it all together
Theorem 5.16. For all constants ǫ, δ > 0, the problem MAX-LINR+(1− ǫ, δ) is NP-hard.
Proof. We just need the following argument from [GR07], which we apply to Z+ and R+ as opposed to Z
and R.
We give a reduction from MAX-LINZ+(1− ǫ, δ/8). Note that our reduction in proving that this problem
was hard produced an instance of MAX-LINZ+ where each equation consists of three variables:
xi + xj + xk = c
where xi, xj , xk, c ∈ Z+. The MAX-LINR+ instance we construct will have exactly the same set of these
equations:
x′i + x
′
j + x
′
k = c
with x′i, x′j, x′k chosen from R+. A solution in integers to the original MAX-LINZ+ instance is automatically
a solution to the MAX-LINR+ instance.
Suppose that with probability at least δ over the choice of equations in the instance, a solution is feasible.
Then, for any such equation:
x′i + x
′
j + x
′
k = c
by choosing each variable xs to be either ⌊x′s⌋ or ⌈x′s⌉ uniformly at random for s = i, j, k we will have
satisfied the equation in the corresponding MAX-LINZ+ instance with probability at least δ/8 thereby con-
tradicting the hardness assumption we made for the instance.
Theorem 5.17. For all constants ǫ, δ > 0, the problem I-SAT∗(1− ǫ, 1/2 + 76δ) is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from MAX-LINR+(1 − ǫ, 19δ) over a set of unknowns x1, . . . , xn. Our
I-SAT∗ instance will have variables y1, . . . , yn; y′1, . . . , y′n. We define a partition S ∪ T where S = {yi|i =
1, . . . , n} and T = {y′j |j = 1, . . . , n}. For each equation over the reals
∑
i aixi = b in an instance of
MAX-LINR+ , we construct the I-SAT∗ clauses: ∑i∈S aiyi ≤ bOR∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≤ b
 ,
 ∑i∈S aiyi ≥ bAND∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≥ b
 (11)
19
Let x1, . . . , xn be a solution for MAX-LINZ+ . We set yi = y′i = xi for all i = 1, . . . , n. A solution satisfying
at least a (1−ǫ) fraction of the equations in the MAX-LINR+ instance will satisfy at least a (1−ǫ) fraction of
the inequality-clauses in the I-SAT∗ instance. Conversely, suppose there exists a solution satisfying at least a
(1/2+76δ) fraction of the inequality-clauses. Then there is at least a 38δ fraction of inequality-clause pairs
of type (11) which must be satisfied. For each such pair, the type 2 clause implies that both (∑i∈S aiyi ≥ b)
and (
∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≥ b) and the type 1 clause implies that one of
∑
i∈S aiyi ≤ b and
∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≥ b must
hold. Therefore, for each such pair one of
∑
i∈S aiyi = b or
∑
i∈T aiy
′
i = b must hold. Setting xi to be
yi for all i if there are more pairs for which
∑
i∈S aiyi ≤ b and y′i otherwise, guarantees that at least a 19δ
fraction of equations
∑
i aixi = b must be satisfied in the original MAX-LINZ+ instance thereby giving us
the necessary gap reduction. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorems 5.16 and 5.17 give us the corollary below that immediately yields the intended (1/2 + δ)
hardness result:
Corollary 5.18. For all ǫ, δ > 0 the problem MAX-STABLE-VALUES(1 − ǫ, 1/2 + δ) is NP-hard.
Proof. We argue that the reduction from I-SAT∗ shown in the proof of Theorem 4.2 is also a gap-preserving
reduction and reduce from I-SAT∗(1− ǫ, 1/2 + δ). Arguing first for (1− ǫ) completeness, we note that if a
clause in the I-SAT∗ instance is satisfied then the corresponding pairwise stability condition is also satisfied.
Suppose now, that (1/2 + δ) fraction of the stability conditions for the active pairs are satisfied. But
each such condition exactly corresponds to a clause being satisfied in the original I-SAT∗ instance thereby
giving us the required (1/2 + δ) soundness for STABLE-VALUES.
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